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Charney Lecture:
The Rule of Law in International
Security Affairs: A U.S. Defense
Department Perspective
Paul C. Ney, Jr.*
Thank you very much for inviting me here today. I am especially
grateful to Dean Chris Guthrie, Professor Mike Newton, and Mrs.
Sharon Charney, who generously endowed this lecture series in
memory of her late husband, Professor Jonathan Charney. Thank you,
as well, to all the members of the Charney family for sharing him with
the Vanderbilt community. Professor Charney taught at Vanderbilt for
forty years and was one of the nation's preeminent scholars and
practitioners of international law. He was a member of the U.S.
delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, which resulted in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.1 At the time of his untimely passing in 2002, he was also
the Co-Editor-in-Chief with Yale Law Professor Michael Reisman of
the American Journal of International Law.

* General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense. B.S. Cornell University, 1980;
J.D./M.B.A. Vanderbilt University 1984. This Essay is a revised version of remarks
delivered on September 3, 2019, at Vanderbilt University Law School in Nashville,
Tennessee, as the 2019 Jonathan I. Charney Distinguished Lecture in International
Law. I thank Thomas H. Lee, Charles A. Allen, Karl Chang, Vida Antolin-Jenkins,
Guillermo Carranza, Lieutenant Commander Robin Crabtree, Matthew McCormack,
Platte Moring, Colonel Jeffrey Palomino, Jack Shaked, Carl Tierney, Catherine Rivkin
Visser, Bart Wager, Danielle Zucker, and other members of the DoD General Counsel's
office for their inestimable contributions to the conception and preparation of this Essay,
and Joshua Minchin and the other student editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw for their expertise and editorial support.
See Jonathan I. Charney, The United States and the Law of the Sea after
1.
UNCLOS III-The Impact of GeneralInternationalLaw, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37,
44 (1983).
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I feel particularly honored as the first alumnus of Vanderbilt Law
School to deliver the Charney Distinguished Lecture in International
Law. 2 In a May 27, 2003, Joint Resolution, the Tennessee General
Assembly honored Professor Charney for "his manifold professional
achievements, his impeccable character, and his stalwart commitment
to living the examined life with courage and conviction." 3 His colleague,
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum, drew a more colorful sketch: "Jon could
at times, and quite proudly and purposely, be one ornery guy .... He
was for quality, for demanding performance. He was against sophistry,
mintmarks, and other indicia of status not substantiated by tangible
intellectual product of unquestionable merit." 4
In his spirit, I will try to avoid "sophistry" and "mintmarks." My
aims are to help you understand how international law affects the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) in practice and how DoD abides by the
rule of law in international security affairs.
I understand that many of you in the audience are first-year law
students. You and others may have little idea of what international law
is or what international lawyers do. I was in the same boat as a law
student, until I participated in the Jessup International Law Moot
Court Competition. But even then, I had little understanding of what
international law in practice meant.
That has certainly changed in my current position. International
law issues come up with some frequency for the civilian and military
lawyers I work with at the Department of Defense today. We at DoD
work with international law in many different ways. Our military
forces on the ground assess and implement applicable laws of war
every day. Our sailors navigate according to the law of the sea. We
provide a range of assistance to foreign partners, including training,
equipment, intelligence sharing, and operational support, and, in doing
so, we comply with applicable domestic and international law.5 This
includes, for example, ensuring that partner forces receiving U.S.
2.
Regrettably, I did not have the privilege of having been taught by Professor
Charney. My Special Assistant and Vanderbilt Law classmate, Platte Moring, had the
great pleasure of having taken several classes with Professor Charney, who also served
as his thesis advisor. I was, however, a student of Professor Hal Maier, the other pillar
of Vanderbilt's twin towers of international law. Professor Maier came to Vanderbilt in
1965 and established the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw. I am grateful to the
Journal and its editors for publishing these remarks.
3.
S.J. Res. 0427, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2003).
4.
Jeffrey Schoenblum, Remarks on Jonathan I Charney, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 8 (2003).

5.
For example, Chapter 16 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code §§ 301-386 (2018)
addresses DoD security cooperation programs and activities. Section 301 defines
"security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense" as "any
program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense
with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A)
To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and
multinational operations; (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign
country during peacetime or a contingency operation; (C) To build relationships that
promote specific United States security interests."
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assistance are vetted for credible allegations of gross violations of
human rights. 6
The lawyers in my office also work closely with lawyers from other
Departments and Agencies in formulating our advice and in
articulating U.S. Government positions on important legal issues. We
work with the Department of State in the negotiation of treaties and
in its conduct of U.S. foreign relations, especially as related to national
7
and international security matters. We work with the Department of
8
Justice (DOJ) on legal issues relevant to DoD that arise in U.S. courts,
typically in matters to which the Department is a party or that
implicate DoD's interests. We very recently worked closely with our
colleagues in the Department of State and at the National Security
Council (NSC) to ensure that my remarks today did not inadvertently
endorse positions inconsistent with U.S. Government policies or
practices.
A large part of our job is giving legal advice that helps shape and
implement defense policy. DoD lawyers play an essential role in
ensuring that the planning and execution of U.S. military operations
comply with the law, including international law. We advise on
relevant treaty terms and customary international law rules. We give
our clients-DoD civilian and military leaders-our best advice about
how domestic and international law apply to the facts before them.
Most of this activity is behind the scenes, and much of it involves
classified information. But just because our role is not as public as
filing briefs or arguing in front of judges doesn't mean we are any less
dedicated to the rule of law.
By way of background, "[i]nternational law consists of a body of
9
In certain
rules governing the relations between States."
individuals
for
rules
prescribes
also
law
circumstances, international
10
In general,
or other non-State entities, like non-State armed groups.
10 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2018) ("Of the amounts made available to the
6.
Department of Defense, none may be used for any training, equipment, or other
assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible
information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.").
"The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time
7.
be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President relative to . . . negotiations with
public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other applications
from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting
foreign affairs. . ." 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (2018).
"[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer
8.
thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers
of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. §
516 (2018).
1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Green Haywood Hackworth ed., 1940).
9.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 17.2.4
10.

(December 2016) ("The law of war applicable in a non-international armed conflict is
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international law is formed when: 1) States accept rules in treaties
(also called "conventions" or "agreements"); or 2) rules develop in
unwritten form known as customary international law. Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of
States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation or, in Latin,
opinio juris.11 General principles of law common to the major legal
systems of the world are also a recognized part of international law. 12
In my view, abiding by the rule of law has two key elements: first,
an international law rule must be recognized as established in treaty
or customary law, and second, a State must implement and comply
with this rule. This means that the rule influences the State's behavior
both ex ante, by informing available policy choices in advance of any
action or decision, and ex post, because the State has established
meaningful compliance mechanisms or institutions and holds
accountable as appropriate those who violate that rule. Both of these
aspects of influencing State behavior are critical, and I will address
each of them in my remarks today.
My lecture will proceed in two parts. First, I'd like to focus on how
international law is formed, especially customary international law,
using examples from cyberspace and outer space. In doing so, I must
highlight the primacy of State practice. Second, I will discuss what it
means to abide by and implement international law. Throughout both
segments, I will refer to Professor Charney's path-marking work on the
law of the sea and international law theory, and also to real-world
implementation. In so doing, it may be worth keeping in mind what
Professor Reisman said about Professor Charney: "While he was
interested in theory and contributed to it and he had many suggestions
to make about improving international law, he was, at heart, an
empiricist. He respected the complexity of events."1 3

I.
There is typically a distinction drawn between the law of
permissible grounds for resorting to force-in Latin, jus ad bellumand the law governing the conduct of war, called jus in bello. I will refer
to the two together as the '"aw of war," which is the term that DoD
uses in its official policies and publications. 14

binding upon all parties to the armed conflict, including State armed forces and nonState armed groups.").
11.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
12.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1; see also LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 10, § 2.1.1 (and sources cited within).
13.
W. Michael Reisman, Jonathan I. Charney: An Appreciation, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 23, 24 (2003).
14.
See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 1.3.
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The United States is a party to the Charter of the United Nations,
which generally prohibits "the threat or use of force" in Article 2(4),15
but also recognizes the jus ad bellum right of self-defense in Article 51:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member." 16 The United States is also party to a number of jus in bello
treaties, such as the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare and the
7
1949 Geneva Conventions.'
Most countries are parties to the United Nations Charter and the
1949 Geneva Conventions, but there can be significant differences in
how States are bound by and interpret the requirements of
international law. States may ratify different treaties, interpret the
same treaty provisions differently, and have differing views on what
customary international law requires. For example, the United
Kingdom for some time has held the view that humanitarian
intervention, in certain circumstances, can be an independent
justification for a State to use armed force in another State's territory
even absent the territorial State's consent, U.N. Security Council
authorization, or collective or individual self-defense.1 8 Although we
recognize that there can be a compelling moral argument for military
intervention in mass atrocity or genocide cases, the United States has
not recognized a free-standing international law right to use force
19
These
against other States solely on humanitarian grounds.
differences among States are pertinent as they demonstrate that
States can and do take different approaches to international law, and
that consensus on certain aspects may take time to develop.
15.
U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
Id. at art. 51.
16.
The U.S. Department of State annually publishes information on treaties and
17.
other international agreements to which the United States is a party. U.S. Dep't of State,
Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements of the United
9
States in Force on January 1, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-contentuuploads/201 /05/
2019)
26,
Sept.
visited
(last
2019-TIF-Bilaterals-web-version.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5AU-EQ77] (archived Sept. 26, 2019). For a list of law of war treaties
to which the United States is a party and other treaties that it has not ratified, see LAW
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 19.2.
See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, GLOBAL BRITAIN:
18.
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S TWELFTH REPORT, 2017-19, HC 1719, at 3-4 (UK) ("The

UK's long-standing position on humanitarian intervention is that it is consistent with
international law if the following three conditions are met: (i) There is convincing
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; (ii) It
must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives
are to be saved; and (iii) The proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate
to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope
to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).").
See, e.g., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 1.11.4.4.
19.
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As I mentioned, Professor Charney was a world-renowned
international maritime law expert 20 and a member of the U.S.
delegation to the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. It took
three diplomatic conferences more than three decades to achieve broad
consensus on the establishment of a territorial sea out to a maximum
breadth of twelve nautical miles and to recognize a 200 nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone-in part because many countries, led by the
United States, were firmly dedicated to the longstanding principle of
freedom of the seas.
But the open-seas norm itself was once an invention. Hugo Grotius
conceived of the freedom of seas, which he called by the Latin term
mare liberum, or "open seas," four centuries ago. 21 At the time,
Portuguese-Spanish assertions of "closed seas" (mare clausum) posed
an alternative view: new seas, like new lands, were viewed as the
property of those (that is, those Europeans) who discovered them. 22
Grotius advanced a new understanding of international law that
allowed the Netherlands-a Lilliputian State with a Gulliverian
navy-to attain astonishing global power. 23 Grotius was so influential
that international lawyers today often forget that freedom of the seas
was once an untested concept in international law.
Today, the swift pace of technological development presents
another occasion for States to reflect on existing international law and
to work towards consensus understandings where possible. For DoD,
rapid advancements in technology and connectivity through
cyberspace present unique national security challenges and
opportunities. For example, as a 2019 assessment by the Director of
National Intelligence notes, "China has the ability to launch cyber
attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical
infrastructure .

..

in the United States.

. .

. Moscow is now staging

cyber attack assets to allow it to disrupt or damage U.S. civilian and
military infrastructure during a crisis . ."24
When it comes to activity in cyberspace, geographic distance from
our adversaries offers no measure of safety. In this area, the United
States must "defend forward," 25 engaging adversaries before their
20.
Professor Charney is co-author of the first three volumes of the definitive
treatise on the law of international maritime boundaries. See 1-3 INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Johnathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993).
21.
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA 7 (Richard Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund
2004).
22.

WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-36 (Michael

Byers trans., rev. ed. 2000).
23.

See ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY:

1660-1783 53, 95-97 (25th ed. 1918) (1890).
24.
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 5 (2019) (statement of Daniel R.
Coats, Director of National Intelligence), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/
2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V4L-FZKH] (archived Sept. 26, 2019).
25.
U.S. Dep't of Def., Summary: Departmentof Defense Cyber Strategy 1 (2018),
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/- 1/-
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actions can affect intended targets. Attempting to protect from cyber
attacks at or near the point of impact or just along international
territorial boundary lines is not only artificial and naive, it is also
ineffective and self-defeating. But as we defend forward, and as our
allies and adversaries do likewise, we must be conscious of the fact that
our actions in cyberspace must comply with existing international law
and norms for responsible State behavior in cyberspace.
We know that international law principles apply in cyberspace,
but which principles and how they apply are actively being discussed
by States. Further discussion, clarification, and cooperation on these
issues are necessary. We also recognize that, like the historical law of
the sea, customary international law applicable to cyberspace may
evolve over time through many rounds, in response to technological
developments that may affect State practice and opinio juris.
There is, nonetheless, some common understanding today on the
applicability of international law principles to cyber operations. An
action in cyberspace may, in certain circumstances, constitute a use of
force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and
customary international law where, for example, a cyber operation
causes physical injury or damage that would be considered a use of
26
Likewise, the
force if caused by traditional physical means.
customary international law prohibition against intervention in the
27
affairs of another State can apply to State conduct in cyberspace. For
example, as the United States and other countries have recognized,
cyber operations by a State that interfere with another country's
ability to hold an election or that manipulate another country's election
28
For further
results would be a clear violation of this prohibition.
reading, I commend to you the Department of Defense Law of War
Manual addressing the international law applicable to cyber
operations.29
But there remain many details to be addressed in applying
international law principles to cyberspace and cyber operations. One
[https://perma.cc/5ZJP-X9BP]
1/1/CYBER STRATEGYSUM1I\ARYFINAL.PDF
(archived Sept. 26, 2019) ("We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber
activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.").
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 16.3.1.
26.
Brian J. Egan, InternationalLaw and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY
27.
J. IN'L L. 169, 175 (2017).
See id.; U.K. Att'y Gen. Jeremy Wright QC, MP, Address on Cyber and
28.
International Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018) (transcript available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21stcentury [https://perma.cc/L5N6-HKX8] (archived Sept. 26, 2019)) (explaining that "the
use by a hostile state of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to alter the
results of an election in another state . . . must surely be a breach of the prohibition on
intervention in the domestic affairs of states").
See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, at 1011.
29.
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unsettled area is the extent to which rules that apply in the context of
territory apply to cyberspace-a unique, manmade domain. Some
commentators assert that territorial analogies and precedents should
be presumptively valid in cyberspace. The assertion harkens back to
the Spanish and Portuguese justifications for the closed-seas norm. If
a European power discovers uncharted land, it owns it. If a European
power discovers uncharted seas, it owns them, too. Is cyberspace more
analogous to the land or the sea? Should the law of cyberspace track
the law of the land? Or the law of the sea? Or, perhaps, the law of outer
space?
Space may be the final frontier, but it is not a legal vacuum. Lawof-the-sea lore claims genesis in the law of ancient Rhodes.3 0 I imagine
that ancient mariners staring out at the ocean had the same sense of
wonder at the vast possibilities and dangers out there that we have
now as we contemplate the expanses of outer space. The challenge of
space is no less intriguing for lawyers.
Space law for the United States is anchored by four treaties dating
from the 1960s and 1970s.3 1 Much has changed in the past fifty years:
there are thousands more satellites with vastly greater and more
diverse capabilities in orbit. And many more States and private
entities are active in space, as illustrated most recently by India's
launch of a mission to the Moon. A major role of the outer space lawyer
is to apply these treaties to new circumstances, and, if necessary, to
advise in the identification and formulation of rules.
Let me give you an example. In 2008, U.S. Government space
lawyers were asked about how the 1967 Outer Space Treaty-the
framework treaty for space and, in part, an arms-control agreementwould affect a proposed DoD action in a very public setting. A U.S.
satellite-USA-193-was in orbit but was malfunctioning and out of
control. U.S. officials feared that it might survive an uncontrolled
reentry, crash in a populated area, and release its propellant, the toxic
chemical hydrazine. The proposal was to shoot down the satellite at a
low point in its orbit to reduce the amount of debris that remained in
space while causing the hydrazine to burn up on reentry to the Earth's
atmosphere.
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
30.
See GRANT GiLMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 2-5
(Foundation Press 1957).
31.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; The Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; The Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; The Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. The
United States is not a State Party to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
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If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity . . . planned
by it . . . in outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space . . . it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before
32
proceeding with any such activity.

Think about some of those phrases, and how they might apply to
the proposed take-down of USA-193. What does "reason to believe"
mean? Probably more than "reason to suspect" but less than specific
knowledge. Or, the phrase "would cause potentially harmful
interference"? Assuming that Article IX applies, what does it require?
A State party doesn't have to stop the activity; it just needs to
before
consultations
international
appropriate
"undertake
And
consultations"?
"international
proceeding." But what constitute
"appropriate"?
are
who determines if those consultations
In 2008, the Outer Space Treaty had been in force for more than
forty years, but no State had previously conducted Article IX
consultations. In the end, based in part on advice from DoD lawyers,
senior U.S. leaders determined that Article IX consultations were not
required prior to engaging the satellite. But, consistent with the
international-notification aim of Article IX, U.S. leaders decided to
make a public announcement before the event. On February 14, 2008,
the NASA Administrator, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Deputy National Security Advisor announced that then33
President George W. Bush had decided to shoot down the satellite.
Thankfully, USA-193 was successfully shot down a week later on
February 20, 2008, stopping it from what would have been an
uncontrolled re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere and minimizing the
amount of debris that might cause interference with other State
34
Parties' activities in outer space.
Since then, much has happened in the space domain. The
President has revived the National Space Council, chaired by the Vice
President;3 5 reinvigorated the U.S. human space exploration
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 31, at art. IX.
32.
Jim Garamone, Navy to Shoot Down Malfunctioning Satellite, ARMED FORCES
33.
PREss SERV. (Feb. 14, 2008), https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=
48974 [https://perma.cc/VEK5-4FQ4] (archived Sept. 26, 2019). The United States also
provided "a notification to the [U.N.] Secretary General, the STSC [Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space], other
UN bodies, and Governments throughout the world the day after the successful
engagement." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 665, 669 https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/
138513.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E5B-ED73] (archived Oct. 14, 2019).
U.S. Dep't of Def., Navy Succeeds in Intercepting Non-Functioning Satellite,
34.
35
114
U.S. NAVY (Feb. 20, 2008), https://www.navy.millsubmit/display.asp?storyid=
2019).
26,
[https://perma.cc/HNE5-5UGE] (archived Sept.
Exec. Order No. 13.803. 82 Fed. Reg. 31,429 (June 30, 2017).
.15

782

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:773

program; 36 directed the streamlining of regulations on commercial use
of space; 3 7 issued a directive on space traffic management; 38 directed
the establishment of U.S. Space Command; 39 and ordered the
Secretary of Defense to prepare a legislative proposal to establish a
U.S. Space Force. 4 0 These directives to work towards a U.S. Space
Force and to establish U.S. Space Command, which was launched on
August 29, 2019,41 have been at the forefront of DoD's recent space law
efforts.
Another important development is that U.S. national defense
policy has declared space to be a warfighting domain. In 2007, the year
prior to the U.S. engagement of USA-193, China conducted a test of an
antisatellite (ASAT) system. That test destroyed the targeted satellite
and created substantial space debris, much of which remains in orbit.
China has deployed a ground-based missile intended to target and
destroy satellites in low-Earth orbit and has tested and is pursuing
other weapons capable of destroying satellites. Russia also has an
ASAT system in development that will likely be operational within the
next several years. Russia has already fielded a ground-based laser
weapon, which could blind or damage our sensitive space-based optical
sensors. More recently, in April 2019, India tested its own ASAT
system. In short, space is no longer a safe harbor, and the United
States-with DoD in the lead-needs to be prepared to defend its
national interests in space. 4 2
Professor Charney, in a 1995 article titled "Universal
International Law," proposed a new approach to the customary
lawmaking process based on multilateral forums:
36.
Space Policy Directive-1, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,501 (Dec. 11, 2017).
37.
Space Policy Directive-2, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,901(May 24, 2018).
38.
Space Policy Directive-3, 83 Fed Reg. 28,969 (June 18, 2018).
39.
Memorandum from the President for the Sec'y of Def. on the Establishment
of United States Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command, 83 Fed. Reg.
65,483 (Dec. 18, 2018).
40.
Space Policy Directive-4, 84 Fed. Reg. 6,049 (Feb. 19, 2019).
41.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Establishes U.S.
Space Command (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/
Article/1948288/department-of-defense-establishes-us-space-command/
[https://perma.cc/HQ4E-T2L7] (archived Oct. 14, 2019).
42.
See The Proposalto Establisha United States Space Force:HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 116th Cong. 4 (2019) (statement of Patrick M. Shanahan,
Acting U.S. Sec'y of Def., & Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff) (transcript available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/
shanahan dunford 04-11-19 [https://perma.cc/RH4A-4GPQ] (archived Sept. 27, 2019))
("Rather than attempt to address each issue in isolation, DoD recognizes the need for a
paradigm shift based on a new set of assumptions that more closely reflect today's
realities: space is not a sanctuary - it is now a warfighting domain, similar to the air,
land, and sea domains; space superiority is a condition that must be gained and
maintained via a range of options, including resilient architectures, offensive and
defensive operations; space doctrine, capabilities, and expertise must be designed to gain
and maintain space superiority, and support operations in other domains; and
spacepower and airpower doctrine and operating concepts are as distinct from one
another as the air domain is from the land, and as the land domain is from the sea.").
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Traditional customary law formation may have sufficed when both the scope of
international law and the number of states were limited. Today, however, the
subject matter has expanded substantially into areas that were traditionally
preserves of states' domestic jurisdiction . . . Rather than state practice and
opinio juris, multilateral forums often play a central role in the creation and
43
shaping of contemporary international law.

Multilateral forums, according to Professor Charney, "include the
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, regional
organizations, and standing and ad hoc multilateral diplomatic
conferences, as well as international organizations devoted to
specialized subjects." 44
Professor Charney's article reflects an important insight:
multilateral forums can play an important role in the clarification and
development of customary international law on novel and contentious
issues. States can listen to and learn from the views of other States and
subject matter experts. Convergence on the meaning of international
law may result as participants begin to understand the issues better
and reflect on the views of others.
However, in practice, multilateral processes often haven't been
very effective in realizing Professor Charney's vision, especially with
respect to the law of war. Customary international law results from a
general and consistent State practice done out of a sense of legal
obligation (opiniojuris). A statement from, or a resolution adopted by,
a multilateral forum is not, as a general matter, State practice or opinio
juris that directly contributes to the formation of customary
international law. 45 Statements in multilateral forums can be
secondary sources that are useful in assessing customary international
law to the extent such statements actually reflect the practice and legal
views of States. 46
Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543
43.
(1993).
Id. at 543-44.
44.
See Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and
45.
William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Jakob Kellenberger, President,
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (Nov. 3, 2006), 46 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 514, 515 (2007)
("We also are troubled by the extent to which the Study relies on non-binding resolutions
of the General Assembly, given that States may lend their support to a particular
resolution, or determine not to break consensus in regard to such a resolution, for
reasons having nothing to do with a belief that the propositions in it reflect customary
international law.").
46.
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law from George Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser,
Dep't of State (Oct. 25, 1974), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (OXFORD UNIV. PRESS & INT'L LAW INST. 1976) ("It may
confidently be assumed that, if the issue of whether such activities are proscribed by the
principle of non-intervention were to be put to a vote today in the United Nations General
Assembly, the vast majority would hold that they are; but whether the practice of those
states will come to support that conclusion remains to be seen.").
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Recognizing this issue and the politics that could be associated
with multilateral forums, the United States has sought to encourage
non-politicized, multilateral discussions on the law of war based on
actual State practice. Although bodies like the United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly will continue to address law of war
issues, there should also be a non-politicized space for substantive law
of war discussions.
For example, over the past eight years, the United States, joined
by a diverse group of other States, has encouraged some specific
practices in processes designed to strengthen respect for the law of war
co-facilitated by the Swiss Government and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).4 7 Our recommended practices are
intended to help minimize politicization and to enrich discussion.
First, there should be a forum for States to discuss the law of war
that isn't simply a forum for States to criticize one another. The law of
war requires that warring parties put aside the political context that
made them enemies and apply humanitarian
protections.
International discussions on the law of war of this nature, in our view,
can be an important opportunity to improve humanitarian protections
in all conflicts.
Second, State representatives should present on their own best
practices in the law of war, rather than censure the practices of other
States. Such criticism is nearly always perceived as political even if it
is offered in good faith.
Third, to engage in substantive law of war discussions, States
should include military or legal experts who are involved in their State
practice, especially in actual operations.
Finally, we have encouraged meetings where each State presents
its own views, rather than focusing dialogue on the wording of a
common text from the forum, like a resolution. In some circumstances,
arguing over the text can divert attention from substantive
discussions. Negotiating texts can also hinder clarification of the law
because a common approach to achieve consensus is to make language
more ambiguous.
The United States has recommended and sought to apply these
specific practices in a variety of contexts where clarification or
development of the law of war are useful: 1) emerging technologies in
the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems; 2) the protection of
civilians in armed conflict; and 3) detention in non-international armed
conflicts. We believe this approach could be useful in certain other
contexts as well.

47.
Conference
Resolution
2,
321C/15/R2
(Dec.
8-10,
2015),
http://rcrcconference.org/app//uploads/2015/04/32IC-AR-ComplianceEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J48Z-2S6H] (archived Sept. 27, 2019); Conference Resolution 1,
31IC/R1 (Nov. 28 - Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/
resolution/3 1 -international-conference-resolution- 1-2011 .htm [https://perma.cc/CYA8DY6E] (archived Sept. 27, 2019).
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Another area where States have different international legal
obligations is the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is an
international forum for prosecuting war crimes and certain other
serious violations of international law. Although many States are
parties to the Rome Statute-the treaty that created the ICC-and
have thereby accepted its jurisdiction, the United States is not a party
48
to the Rome Statute and has not consented to its jurisdiction. The
United States respects the decision of those nations that have chosen
to join the ICC, and, in turn, we expect that our decision not to join and
not to place our citizens under its jurisdiction will also be respected.
The ICC, however, has asserted the right to investigate and
prosecute our people without our consent. It purports to evaluate U.S.
accountability efforts. The U.S. policy in response to these ICC
assertions is very clear and has been stated in remarks by Ambassador
Bolton and Secretary Pompeo. The bottom line is that: "we reject such
a flagrant violation of our national sovereignty." 49 The U.S. view, as
Secretary Pompeo has indicated, is that "the ICC is attacking
America's

rule of law."5 0

The United

States

holds

our people

accountable for their actions, and the United States will take the
necessary actions to protect our people from prosecution by the ICC
without its consent.

II.
Indeed, respect for the rule of law is a bedrock commitment of the
U.S. Department of Defense. And DoD lawyers, naturally, play an
essential role in ensuring that the Department's activities comply with
applicable laws.
DoD has more than 12,000 civilian and military lawyers. We have
operational lawyers embedded at the brigade, air wing, and naval
strike group level in every theater of operations. When our warfighters
conduct missions, law of war briefings by military lawyers-Judge
Advocate General (JAG) officers-are as routine as briefings by
Statement on Behalf of the United States of America, 16th Session of the
48.
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (Dec. 8, 2017), https://asp.ice-cpi.int/
icedocs/asp-docs/ASP16/ASP-16-USA.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF98-CXSK] (archived Sept.
27, 2019).
49. John R. Bolton, National Security Adviser John Bolton Remarks to Federalist
Society, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-securityadviser-john-bolton-remarks-federalist-society [https://perma.cc/8ZKL-Q3Z6] (archived
Sept. 27, 2019).
Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks to the Press (Mar. 15, 2019)
50.
https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-the-press-6/
at
. available
(transcript
[https://perma.cc/AF78-35H6] (archived Sept. 27, 2019)).
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intelligence officers. We have international law JAG elements in every
combatant command legal office, with the specific mission to advise on
the law of war.51 What does this say about the U.S. armed forces? The
United States takes its obligation to abide by the law of war seriously,
and our lawyers on the ground prove it.
Let me give you an example of DoD lawyers in action, one that
includes Professor Charney's expertise-the law of the sea. Countries
like Iran and China have sought to exert national control over
international straits and waters. This is one of the most pressing issues
in international security today. For example, Iran seeks to deny
navigational rights through the Strait of Hormuz, despite customary
international law rules permitting transit passage through straits
used for international navigation. Similarly, China makes excessive
maritime claims in the South China Sea that impede freedom of
navigation and are inconsistent with customary international law.
You might recall seeing news stories about challenges to freedom
of navigation in key waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the
South China Sea. Although I can't discuss specific events, I can give
you a general look at how the United States would react in
international security scenarios like these, consistent with the rule of
law, with a specific eye on the role of DoD lawyers.
First, having the facts is always important. The intelligence
community works to gain as much information about flashpoint
incidents as possible-the who, what, where, why, and how. Second,
the National Security Council (NSC) staff at the White House will
typically convene an interagency process and start compiling a menu
of policy choices for how to respond. They might ask the Department of
State for diplomatic options and Treasury for economic options like
sanctions, and they might ask DoD for military options. Operational
planners at the relevant geographic combatant commands (like U.S.
Central Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) and in the office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the country's top military
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President) would draw up
those potential military responses. The lawyers in my office work
closely with combatant command and Joint Staff lawyers as those

51.
See U.S. Dep't of Def. Directive 2311.01E, Dep't of Def. Law of War Program,
5.7, ¶ 5.11 (May 9, 2006), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/
issuances/dodd/231101e.pdf?ver=2019-04-03-105531-777 [https://perma.cc/4ZTN-6CM9]
(archived Sept. 26, 2019) ("The Heads of the DoD Components shall [:] Make qualified
legal advisers at all levels of command available to provide advice about law of war
compliance during planning and execution of exercises and operations; and institute and
implement programs to comply with the reporting requirements established in section
6.... The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall [:] Designate the command
legal adviser to supervise the administration of those aspects of this program dealing
with possible, suspected, or alleged enemy violations of the law of war; .. . Ensure all
plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement issued by the command and its
subordinate commands and components are reviewed by legal advisers to ensure their
consistency with this Directive and the law of war.").

1
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options are framed to help ensure they would comply with the law,
including by reviewing any targeting options that might be presented.
Let me illustrate this legal team effort with hypothetical
examples. Suppose a country or surrogate militia had used armed
force-such as an anti-ship missile, armed boarding and/or capture, or
a contact mine-against a U.S.-flagged vessel or warship in
international waters or during transit passage in an international
strait. Or suppose a country or surrogate force had used that kind of
force against a foreign-flagged vessel that specifically requested U.S.
military assistance in response.
Let's say that the U.N. Security Council has not adopted a
resolution pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter authorizing the use of force in response to such
aggressive actions. 5 2 And the United States has not taken the position
that a violation of the freedom of navigation is an independent ground
for the use of armed force under international law. But nations always
maintain the inherent right to exercise self-defense in accordance with
international law.53 Self-defense may be exercised either in a State's
own national self-defense, or in the collective self-defense of a partner
or ally.
Our analysis of whether military options could be authorized in a
legitimate exercise of national or collective self-defense would start
with a few key questions: Did the event constitute an armed attack or
threat of imminent armed attack such that self-defense could be
invoked? What were the flag jurisdictions of any vessels attacked or
captured? Does the United States have a mutual defense treaty
obligation to the particular State of the foreign-flagged vessel, or has
the foreign country in question specifically requested U.S. military
assistance to defend it? If the event constituted an armed attack
against a foreign-flagged vessel whose flag country requested U.S.
military assistance in response, then there could be-depending on the
specific facts-a valid international legal basis to support a U.S.
military response in the collective self-defense of that flag State, a
response that would be followed immediately by Department of State

Article 42 of the U.N. Charter provides: "Should the Security Council consider
52.
that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 42.
See U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
53.
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations..."); LAw OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 1.11.5.
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reporting to the U.N. Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. 54
But use of force in self-defense is also informed by the customary
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. In
addition, during such an operation, U.S. military forces would comply
with applicable jus in bello rules. For example, they would distinguish
between lawful military targets and protected objects and persons such
as civilians, and they would refrain from attacks expected to cause
excessive harm to civilians.5" Furthermore, when the justification is
self-defense, no armed response would be justified under international
law if, for example, the precipitating use of force was a one-time
accident and thus not likely to recur. So, we'd also ask questions like:
Is there any evidence that the precipitating use of force was accidental?
What non-force options have we tried? What are the estimated
casualties resulting from any of the contemplated force options?
The answers to those questions represent only half of the legal
equation. In addition to the questions I just posed related to the
international law basis for the use of force in self-defense, we'd also
assess any proposed military options for legality under domestic law.
Although my focus in this lecture is international law, I'd like to give
you a sense of the domestic legal issues involved in situations like
these, because they are often intertwined with the international law
issues.

What legal authority would the President be invoking if he were
to authorize military force? Is there a statute authorizing the military
options contemplated? If not, could the President use force nonetheless
under his constitutional Article II powers if he identifies significant
national interests, and the situation does not amount to "war" in the
constitutional sense requiring congressional authorization? What
might those qualifying national interests be? What have Presidents
done in the past? U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding presidential
use of armed force absent a congressional declaration of war are rare, 56
and so guidance on these vital questions in practice is provided by the
54.
"Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51.
55.
See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, §§ 5.5, 5.10.
56.
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863) (upholding, by a 5-4 vote,
President Lincoln's April 19, 1861, proclamation of a blockade of southern ports one week
after the taking of Fort Sumter by Confederate forces while Congress was in recess);
Thomas H. Lee, The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations Law: A Dress Rehearsal for
Modern Transformations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 64 (2008) ("[B]y proclaiming the
blockade in April 1861, Lincoln had committed a belligerent act that was unauthorized
by the explicit words of the Constitution and unauthorized by congressional statutes.
Nor could the act be grounded in some defensive gloss on his power as Commander in
Chief, in light of the patently offensive use of armed force on the private citizens of
neutral foreign countries that had neither invaded the United States nor actively aided
insurrection.").
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legal opinions of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC). The most recent ones are instructive, namely OLC's 2011
57
opinion regarding air strikes in Libya and its 2018 opinion regarding
58
air strikes in Syria.
If you have some time, I urge you to read them-they are public
and easily accessible online, along with many other unclassified OLC
opinions.59 One thing that you will see is the remarkable degree of
continuity across administrations. For instance, the 1994 Haiti and
6
1995 Kosovo opinions during the Clinton Administration o and the
2011 Libya opinion during the Obama Administration are key
underlying opinions for the 2018 Syria opinion during this
administration.
Legal analysis is conducted within DoD, with lawyers advising
components up and down the chain of command. It is also discussed
and debated with lawyers working on the NSC staff and across
relevant departments and agencies-at the State Department, CIA,
DOJ, and others. We answer questions. We may gather and provide
more facts and analysis. We do what lawyers do in this country every
day: we give our best legal advice to clients-here, our nation's
leaders-who have to make tough decisions.
Up to this point, I've given you a sense of how international law
affects DoD policymaking and the decisions that the U.S. Government
makes in the international security realm ex ante. I'd like to turn next
to some examples of how we demonstrate fidelity to the rule of law by
respecting applicable international law ex post.
First, consider the differing positions between the United States
and China regarding the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The United
States has not ratified the Convention but accepts its provisions on
traditional uses of the seas as customary international law,61 and thus
Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011).
57.
April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op.
58.
O.L.C. 1 (2018).
See Office of Legal Counsel, Opinions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, June 5, 2016,
59.
(archived
[https://perma.cc/Q8XK-MG7B]
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions-main
Sept. 27, 2019).
Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173
60.
(1994); Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C.
327 (1995).
U.S. Diplomatic Note Responding to Ecuador, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2017
61.
DIGEST

OF

UNITED

STATES

PRACTICE

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAw

531-32,

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2017-Digest-of-United-StatesPractice-in-International-Law.pdf [https://perma.cclLBV7-JPBB] (archived Oct. 14,
2019) ("With regard to the statements contained in Ecuador's declaration on accession
to the Convention of September 24, 2012, the United States wishes to recall that,
although the United States is not yet a Party to the Convention, it has long regarded the
Convention as reflecting customary international law with respect to traditional uses of
the ocean. Since 1983. the United States has acted in accordance with the Convention's
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binding on all States including non-parties to the Convention like the
United States. This includes the establishment and maximum extent
of maritime zones such as the twelve nautical-mile territorial sea and
the 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, as well as the
navigational rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, such as
the freedom of navigation and overflight, the right of transit passage
through international straits, and the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea. 6 2

China, by contrast, has ratified the Convention 63 and abides by it
when compliance suits China's national interests. However, China has
also engaged in a decades-long campaign to convert a large swath of
the South China Sea into its own exclusive preserve, in a way that is
clearly inconsistent with international law as reflected in the
Convention. 64 The Chinese, in effect, are seeking to revive the
sixteenth-century Portuguese closed-seas norm. The juxtaposition of
U.S. non-ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention plus U.S.
compliance with the provisions it regards as reflecting customary
international law, with China's ratification and non-compliance, is a
good example of what I mean by ex post commitment as an essential
element to the rule of law. Simply ratifying a treaty is not enough; by
the same token, not ratifying a treaty doesn't mean a State is a ruleof-law scofflaw.
My second example of U.S. commitment to the rule of law in
international security affairs concerns a relatively obscure feature of
United States-Iran relations. The example also gives you a sense of the
diverse nature of the work the lawyers in the DoD Office of General
Counsel do. In the 1970s, the United States and Iran were close allies,
with billions of dollars in bilateral business. And then the Iranian
Revolution happened.
Iranian militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and seized
fifty-two U.S. hostages on November 4, 1979. A little more than a year
later, on January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran signed the
Algiers Accords, an international agreement in which Iran agreed to
release the U.S. hostages,6 5 which it did the next day. The United
States, for its part, agreed:
balance of interests, including with respect to its exercise of navigation and overflight
rights and lawful uses of the sea on a worldwide basis.").
62.
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, arts. 3, 38, 45, 57, 87, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
63.
See id.
64.
See U.S. Diplomatic Note to China, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2016 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 520-22, https://www.state.gov/wp-

content/uploads/2019/05/2016-Digest-Chapter-12-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5PA-9Z6T]
(archived Oct. 14, 2019).
65.
The Algiers Accords comprised several separate documents, including a
General Declaration of the Algerian government, and a Claims Settlement Agreement.
See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
at 3, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State Bull. No. 2047 (1981); Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
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To terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of
United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to
nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further
litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims
66
through binding arbitration.

The arbitration was to take place in The Hague before the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, a nine-member tribunal consisting of
three members nominated by Iran and the United States each, who
would in turn nominate three other members including the
President. 6 7 The Tribunal could hear claims en banc or in threemember panels. The United States committed to collecting and
depositing all Iranian assets held by US banks by July 19, 1981, with
one billion dollars to be deposited in an escrow account in the Bank of
England. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the President's power to
68
make this international agreement in Dames & Moore v. Regan.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has been a prime catalyst
of the evolution of international arbitration and investment law. Many
of the most prominent international arbitrators and practitioners
today have been involved with the 3,900 cases the Tribunal has already
decided. It was an early adopter of United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL's) model arbitration rules
promulgated in 1976,69 which contributed greatly to the Rules'
worldwide dissemination and burnished the reputation of UNCITRAL
generally.
More than thirty-eight years later, the Tribunal is still active. In
fact, on June 14, during heightened tensions with Iran in the Strait of
Hormuz and five days before the downing of a U.S. Navy unmanned
aircraft in the area, my Deputy General Counsel for International
Affairs, Chuck Allen, as a member of the State Department-led team,
was making a closing presentation before the Tribunal on the last set
of major claims before it. All the claims of U.S. nationals against Iran
have already been processed; the only claims left are multibilliondollar claims alleged against the U.S. Government for contract
amounts (with interest) that Iran had in connection with the U.S.
Foreign Military Sales Program.
Step back for a moment. What does it say about the United States
that, despite the nearly four decades of troubled relations between our
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 3, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State Bull.
No. 2047 (1981).
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
66.
Algeria, at 3, reprinted in U.S. Dep't. of State Bull. No. 2047 (1981).
67.
Id. at 10.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
68.
G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976).
69.
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two nations, the United States is still honoring the international law
commitment to Iran that it undertook in the 1981 Algiers Accords, even
when most of the remaining claims are Iran's claims against the
United States? Consider this example of U.S. commitment to the rule
of law in international security affairs juxtaposed against DoD's two
interactions with Iran in mid-June of this year. All are examples of how
the United States abides by international law in difficult
circumstances with important national interests at stake. Even amidst
conditions implicating the potential for the use of force, the United
States honored a decades-old international law promise, signifying
what it means to be truly dedicated to the international rule of law.
I will close by emphasizing that the rule of law, for the U.S.
Department of Defense, isn't just about lawyers and legal rules. The
DoD implements and secures the rule of law through the professional
values that everyone in the Department seeks to uphold. We all swear
an oath to support and defend the Constitution. DoD leaders, including
commanders and commissioned and non-commissioned officers
throughout the chain of command, recognize the importance of ethics
and values, and there is an expectation that each and all will conduct
themselves in accord with the highest standards.
Secretary of Defense Esper, in his first message to the Department
of Defense in June 2019, underscored the great importance of "a
commitment by all-especially Leaders-to those values and behaviors
that represent the best of the military profession and mark the
character and integrity of the Armed Forces that the American people
admire." 70 And, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joe
Dunford has said, when we go to war, we "bring our values with us.""i
Comporting with those standards reinforces our institutional
respect for the rule of law. In the DoD Law of War Manual, we
emphasize the importance not only of the law but also of honor and
other professional military values as means to ensure respect for full
compliance with law of war in military operations.7 2 The rule of law is
in our DNA.

III.
I hope my remarks have given you a sense of what the Office of
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense does, along with
some understanding of the Department's commitment to the rule of
70.
Memorandum from Mark T. Esper, Acting U.S. Sec'y of Def., to All
Department of Defense Employees (June 24, 2019) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Defense).
71.
Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Remarks and Q&A
at the Center for a New American Security Next Defense Forum (Dec. 14, 2015)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/636952/gendunfords-remarks-and-qa-at-the-center-for-a-new-american-security-next-defe/
[https://perma.cc/GN7N-QZA9] (archived Sept. 27, 2019)).
72.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 2.6.
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law in international security affairs. We advise the nation's
warfighters and their leaders on issues, challenges, and problems that
are complex, consequential, and vital to the security of our country and
the world. If this job description interests you, if you aspire to public
service, I encourage you to consider joining us in the national security
law practice.
Should you take that path, I assure you that there is an additional
and immeasurable benefit: the people you will work with are
exceptional and will be a constant source of inspiration. Every day, I
am thankful for the privilege of serving on this team. Thank you, as
well, for the privilege of addressing you in this year's Charney
Distinguished Lecture in International Law.

